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In the Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
HUBERT \YOLFE, SHIRLEY WOLFE,

his \Yife, ELLIOTT WOLFE, KAYLA
\YOLFE and :JfERRILL STRONG, copartners, doing business under the firm
name and style of WOLFE'S DEPART:JlEXT STORE and WOLFE'S DEp ART:i\IEXT STORE, a co-partnership,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
SARAH \YHITE and JAMES L. WHITE,
her husband,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
7153

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for breach of covenant contained
in a lease agreement. A general demurrer to the complaint as amended was sustained, and from the judgment
dismissing the action, plaintiffs have appealed.
It is alleged in the complaint that on February 19,
1945, appellants and r~espondents entered into said agree·
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ment by the terms whereof, respondents leased to ap·
pellants that certain building at 248-56 South State
Street in Salt Lake City for the term commencing March
7, 1945, and ending :May 31, 1956 with the privilege of
renewal for an additional ten years. The lease is made
a part of the complaint and contains among others the
following provisions :
"(3) The rental for the last ten-year term of
this lease is fixed at Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00)
per month, upon the express condition that the Les·
sees will, and they hereby agree to, at their own ex·
pense, make permanent improvements to the build·
ing herein leased, including the installation of a
first-class front therein, which improvements shall
cost not less but may cost more than, Ten Thousand
Dollars ( $10,000.00). Said Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00) shall not include the cost of trade fixtures, or any other removable fixtures, but shall
include only the cost of permanent improvements to
the building. If it should develop that necessary
permanent improvements can be made for less than
Ten Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00), then the rent
for the last ten-year term of this lease shall be in·
creased Ten Dollars ($10.00) per month, or fraction thereof, for every thousand dollars, or fraction
thereof, that the permanent improvements cost less
than Ten Thousand Dollars ( $10,000.00), and for
the purpose of determining the fact, Lessees agree
at the completion of said permanent improvements
to furnish Lessors with an itemized statement of the
cost of permanent improvements made as aforesaid.
The said permanent improvements are to be com·
menced on or before June 7th, 1946, or as soon thereafter as Government restrictions will permit. Rental
shall be paid during the time said improvements
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are being- made. All such pennanent improvements
and construction shall be completed free and clear
of all liens and claims of contractors, sub-contractors, mechanics, laborers, materialmen and other
persons having· sin1ilar claims. All such permanent
improvements shall upon installation become part
of the realty and shall be surrendered to the Lessors
in good order and condition as when constructed,
reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire- or
other casualty excepted. After said permanent improvements are made, it is agreed that further
structural changes shall not be made to said premises by the Lessees, without first obtaining the written consent of the Lessors, which consent Lessors
covenant will not unreasonably be withheld.
'' ( 6) In consideration of the rental he-rein
fixed, the Lessees agree to and do hereby accept said
premises in the condition and state of repair they
are now in, and for the last ten years of this lease,
all improvements, upkeep and repairs, of e.very kind
and nature whatsoever, regardless of the extent
thereof and whether the same be ordinary or extraordinary, and regardless of how the same may be
necessitated, except as hereinafter stated, including
repair and upkeep of the heating plant and replacement of all glass, including plate glass broken, are
to be made at the expense of the Lessees. If plate
glass insurance is carried, it shall be carried at the
expense of the Lessees. (Italics ours.)
'' (8) For the entire term of this lease the Lessors shall have the obligation to keep the roof of the
leased premises in good condition and repair; to
pay general taxes and lighting assessments levied
aO'ainst said property, all fire insurance premiums
a~d premiums on any other insurance the owner
elects to carry. (Italics ours.)
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"(11) Lessors shall not be liable for any damage occasioned by failure to keBp said premises in
repair and shall not be liable for any damage done,
caused or occasioned by or from plumbing, gas,
water, steam or other pipes, or the bursting, leaking
or running of any washstand, tank, water closet or
waste pipe, in, upon or about said building or premises, nor from any damage occasioned by water arising from acts or neglect of neighboring tenants.''
(Italics ours.)
In the complaint, it is alleged in substance, that pre·
para tory to making the permanent improvements re·
quired by paragraph three, Lessees employed a qualified
architect, who made application to the Building Inspector
for a permit to make said improvements, and that the
Building Inspector notified said architect under date of
March 21, 1946, that it bad been called to the Inspector's
attention:
"That the rafters which form the roof framing
have been overstressed and are sagging under the
load they -carry, also the girders between the columns
at the rear of the store are undersized and bowed."
(Italics ours.)
and that the application for permit would be held in
abeyance until assurance was given that ''the roof condition will be take'fl; care of," and the Inspector states in
said letter: "A plan showing your proposal will be ex·
pected." (Italics ours.)
It is then alleged that the Building Inspector sent
another letter to Lessees under date of April 29, 1946,
stating that the trusses of the roof truss system "were
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not adequate both as to des·ign and as to constructiofb."
Also that ''the main ceiling beams both for the front and
rear part of the store are sagged and a,re evidern.tly too
light to carry the roof load," and that "the To of drainage system has proved to be inadequate." (Italics ours.)
The provisions of the Building Code, particularly
Sec. 201 and Sees. 301 to and including 305 are made a
part of the complaint and that in Sec. 301, it is provided
that any building or portion thereof found to be dangerous or unsafe or which violates the provisions of
said Code may be corndemned by the Building Inspector
and that the Building Inspector shall serve notice on the
owner in writing or to the person in charge of any building or premises setting forth what must be done to make
swid building safe, and that the person receiving such
notice shall commence with,in forty-eight hours to make
the necessary changes, repairs or alterations and proceed diligently with such work and that no building shall
be occupied after the service of said notice until the
instructions of the Building Inspector have bee~ complied with.
It is alleged that Lessors were notified by the Building Inspector "of the u~safe condition of said roof" on
January 22, 1946, and by Lessees on several occasions
prior to June 7th, and of the requirements and letters
of the Building Inspector, but that Lessors failed to
meet said requirements and to put said roof in safe condition, and that

''in order to occupy the leased premises at all
to make them tenantable, plaintiffs were com-
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pelled to comply with said requirements aforesaid
and did place said roof in good condition and repair
and repaired the same to make it safe and in good
condition and also so as to provide proper drainage" (Italics ours.) (Br., p. 22, par. 7.)
By what appellants have designated a "Bill of Particulars,'' they allege that in the opinion of certain architects, engineers and contractors employed by them ''the
best, quickest and most econmnical method of making
said roof safe was to tear down the entire roof'' and that
as steel was '' easier to obtain" than wood, steel construction was used. (Br., p. 33.) Further, "that since
steel was used, it was unnecessary to continue the use of
eight center supporting posts in the middle of the storeroom and they were eliminated." (Br., p. 34.) By
"Exhibit D" attached to the complaint, (Br., pp. 31-33)
the items of cost aggregating the damage claimed by
appellants are set forth, from which exhibit it appears
that a new roof of steel beam construction was substituted for the old wood roof at a net cost of $12,175.39.
Other.items bring the total damage prayed for to $21,121.58. The complaint contains son1e additional allegations which in no sense constitute a part of plaintiffs'
cause of action (to which we shall hereafter make reference), but the foregoing are in substance all allegations,
including all provisions of the lease which are pertinent
to the present inquiry.
Under the agreement:
(a) Lessees ''accept said premises 1n the condition and state of repair they are now in." (Par. 6.)
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(b) ''For the last ten years of this lease, all improYements, upkeep a11lid repairs of every kind and nature
whatsoever regardless of the extent thereof and whether
the same be ordinary or extraordinary and regardless
of how the same may be necessitated except as hereinafter stated . . . are to be made at the expense of
the Lessees." (Par. 6.) (Italics ours.)
(c) Lessors agree that "for the entire term of
this lease, Lessors shall have the obligation to keep the
roof of the leased premises in good condition and re··
pair." (Par. 8.)
(d) "Lessors shall not be liable for any damage
occasioned by failure to keep said premises in repair,
and shall not be liable for any damage done, caused or
occasioned by or from plumbing, gas, water, etc." (Par.
11.)

ARGUMENT
We must test the sufficiency of the complaint by a
d~termination of Lessors' obligation under the lease and
by ascertaining whether, under the facts alleged, a breach
is shown.
First, what was Lessors'

obligation~

''Lessors agree that 'for the entire term of this
lease, lessors shall have the obligation to keep the
roof of the leased premises in good condition1 and
repair.' " (Par. 8.)
This is the sole and only covenant of Lessors upon
which Lessees can rely and must be construed together
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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''At their own expense, (to) make permanent
improvements to the building herein leased, including the installation of a first-class front therein,
which improvements shall cost not less, but may cost
more, than ten thousand dollars. . . . After said
permanent improvem·ents are made, it is agreed
that further structural changes shall not be made
to said premises by the Lessees, without first obtaining the written consent of the Lessors, which consent Lessors covenant will not unreasonably be withheld." (Par. 3.)
"In consideration of the rental herein fixed the
Lessees agree to arnd do hereby accept the premises
in the condition and sta.te of repair they are now in
and for the last ten years of this lease, all improvements, upkeep and repairs of every kind and nature
whatsoever and whether the same be ordinary or
extraordinary and regardless of how the same mG!!J
be necessitated except as hereinafter stated . . .
are to be made at the expense of the Lessees.''
(Par. 6.)
The nature and character of the ''permanent improvements'' n1entioned in paragraph 3 are nowhere
specified, but were left to the judgment and discretion
of the Lessees. The words, ''except as hereinafter
stated" in paragraph 6 refer, of course, to the abovequoted provision of paragraph 8 relating to the roof.
Now having all these provisions in mind, let us ascertain: (a) What was the legal obligation of the Lessors;
and (b) Does the work performed by the Lessees fall
within the Lessors' obligation~
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COVEN~\.NT

·•TO 1'-EB~P," DO:b~S NOT OBLIGATE
··TO PL.A.CE,'' IN REPAIR

The written covenant of the landlord to make repairs may not be extended beyond its fair intent or enlarged by construction ( 36 C. J. 135), and the word '' repair'' has reference to the condition of the premises at
the time of the letting and requires the Lessors only to
keep the premises in the condition in which they were at
the time of the lease (36 C. J. 142), that is to say, in the
condition in ·which the Lessees accepted them. The covenant "to keep in repair" and •' to keep in as good repair
as tlzey are now in" mean the same. (32 Am. Jur. 585.)
In St. Joseph etc. Co. v. St. Louis etc. Co., (Mo.)
36 S. W. 602, the lease provided:
''The party of the second part, moreover
"'ill keep said demised railroad equipment and property in good order and repa·ir, etc." (Italics ours.)
Of course this means the same as g·ood condition and
repair. It cannot have any other meaning. Says the
court:
''A covenant to keep leased premises in repair
imposes upon the tenant the obligation 'to keep'
the premises in as good repair as when the agreement is made. Middlekauf v. Snlith, 1 :Md. 329 (and
other cases). Covenants 'to keep in repair' and
'to keep in as good repair as they now are' are held
to amount to the same thing."
"To keep the roof in good condition and repair"
did not imply an obligation to do anything to make the
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building tenantable or fit for use, but only to do such
repair work as might become necessary after the date
of the lease to keep the roof in as good condition as
when it had been accepted, that is, as of February 19,
1945.
In F arr v. Wasatch Chemical 0 ompany, ____________ Utah
____________ , 143 Pac. ( 2d) 281, the lease provided :
''Lessor shall keep the floor and roof in good
repair, except as to damages caused by Lessee-, at
her expense so as to keep said premises tenantable;
all other repairs and alterations after oc-eupancy
shall be done at the Lessee's expense." (Italics
ours.)
The Lessor sued for the rent and for $17 4.00 expended
in repairing the floor broken by Lessee's hea.vy machinery. The Lessee by way of defense alleged in its answer
an oral agreement:
''The plaintiff, being apprised and knowing the
nature and kind of business in which the defendant
was engaged, covenanted and agreed with said defendant to place that certain warehouse existing
upon the above said premises in good and serviceable condition for the immediate occupancy and benefit and use of the said defendant, and further the
said plaintiff specifically agreed to repair and mainta.in the roof, elevator and floors of the above warehouse in good, safe and serviceable condition."
(Italics ours.)
The court held that said a.llegations set forth a collateral obligation of the L·essor to place in repair which
covenant was additional to, outside of, and beyond the
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covenant of the landlord as contained in the lease, and
that evidence was proper to sustain such additional
agreement. In other words, the court held, in effect
that the written coYenant "to keep" did not include the
covenant '"to place'' in good repair.
Let us quote briefly from the case of Nixon v. Gammon, (Ky.) 2:29 S. \Y. 75. In that case, the lease contained the proYision that the landlord should make all
''extraordinary repairs'' and that
' ' The said Lessee further agrees that he· will
keep said premises in good condition and repair and
at the termination of the lease to surrender them to
the Lessor in as good condition as they are now, ordinary wear and tear from reasonable use thereof
excepted.''
It differs from the case at bar in that the obligation
"to keep in good condition and repair" was on the Lessee
instead of the Lessor, and it applied to the entire premises, rather than to just the roof. The last clause of
the covenant, ''to surrender the same to the Lessor etc.''
is not important because it did not affect the Lessee's obligation to "keep said premises in good condition and
repair.'' The court remarks :
''By this clause, Lessee agreed to keep up all
ordinary repairs to that part of the building which
he occupied, and Lessor was only required to keep up
extraordinary repairs. 'Ordinary repairs' are such
as result from ordinary wear and tear of the building and its decay, but 'extraordinary repairs' is
something greater than this. It is such repairs as
are made necessary by some unusual or unforeseen
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occurrence which does not destroy the building, but
merely renders it less suited to the use for which it
was intended. The word 'repair' does not include
the word 'rebuild' and the courts have never so
held.''
Could anything be plainer than this statement of the
law or more applicable to the case at bar~ Our case,
however, is even stronger because here Lessees accepted
the premises in the condition they were in February 19,
1945, and agreed to make all ''improvements'' and all
extraordina.ry repairs -of whatsoever kind or character
and regardless of the nature and extent thereof and
however necessitated, while Lessors, under the construction placed upon the language of the lease by the Kentucky court, agreed to make only ordinary repairs to
the roof, which the Lessees bad accepted. Can it with
reason be contended that the obligation to keep an accepted roof in good condition and repair obligated the
Lessor to destroy the roof and the understructure support
thereof and substitute one of steel beam construction~
Would not such substitution be an "improvement" or an
"extraord.inary repair" within the obligation of the
Lessees~ Will the court impose an unjustified obligation
on the Lessors in order that the Lessees may escape the
consequences of their acceptance of the roof (as part of
the premises), as it was, and of their specific covenant
to make a.t their own expense all improvements and all
extraordina.ry repairs, however necessitated~ There is
no aU ega tion in the complaint that the roof as accepted
ever beca·me out of repair. There is no possible basis
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for any such claim. The letters of the Building Inspector upon which appellants rely show nothing of the kind.
Those letters shtnY that the criticism offered was that
the roof trusses '·were JIO·t adeqwa.te, both as to design
and as to erection." His criticisms do not intimate that
there "·as any change in the roof from the time it was
accepted until the time of inspection.
In Kin.gsted ~·. fVTight etc. Co., (Minn.) 133 N. W.
399, the obligation of the landlord was ''to keep the
premises in good repair'' and it was held that the landlord was not required to improve the property by the
construction of a drain to carry water, which in wet
weather flowed into the basement. The court remarks:
"This did not impose upon him an obligation to
rnake improvements or betterments. . . . The
defendant took the premises in their condition when
the contract was made, the building was not then out
of repair and the covenant for repairs can be referred only to such defects in the building as subsequently arose, injury or damage arising from the
elements or natural decay incident to the property
and its use." (Italics ours.)
While the court remarks that ''the building was not
then out of repair'' the same is true as to the roof, in
the case at bar so far as Lessees are concerned, for they
are estopped from claiming otherwise by their acceptance of the premises.''
There is a studious avoidance by appellants of the
phrase ••keep in good conditio,n and repair'' as used in
the lease. They seek to substitute the term "place" in
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a condition, and in a different condition from that accepted. 32 A'm. Jur. pp. 673-4 points out that these
terms e~press entirely different obligations, also that
different covenants in the same contract dealing with
''condition as accepted,'' and ''condition as agreed to be
kept", are clearly distinguishable. To quote:
''A covenant to keep leased premises in' repair'
imposes upon the tenant the obligation to keep them
in as good r~pair as at the commencement of the
term. . . . It wouJd seem clear that under a covenant . . . to keep premises in such repair as the
same are in at the commencement of the term, he is
not liable for defects arising from the original construction of the building.''
In Cadman v. By-Grade Foods Produc·ts Corpovration, (Mass.) 33 N. E. (2d) 759, the action was for failure
to return the premises ''in good tenantable condition''
as stipulated. Actually they were not in that condition
when returned because they required a new floor understructure. Plaintiff demanded a strict technical interpretation of this covenant. Says the court:
"All the plaintiff's exceptions are based upon
their contention that the defendant was obligated
to surrender the premises at the end of the term in
good tenantable repair, regardless of their actual
conditio~l at the time the term began.''
While in that case it was admitted in the lease that
the premises were then in "good condition," it is the
same here because of appellants' acceptance of the condition as of February 19, 1945. The court then remarks:
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'·There "·as evidence from which it could ha:ve
been folmd that the conditions above described were
substantially the same at the beginning as at the
end of the term.
"The phrases 'in good tenantable repair' and 'in
good condition~ appearing in such lease do not have
a fi.xed or technical meaning which is. always the
same regardless of the character or use of the building to which they refer.''
Later on the court remarks in referring to the good
condition at the commencement of the lease:
''The standard there set is the actual state of
repair, "~hether good or bad, in which the premises
were at the time of the letting, not a degree of repair
measured by the abstract standard of goodness.
''It is proper in the construction of the language
of a lease to read together different provisions
therein dealing with the same subject matter, and
where possible all the language used should be given
a reasonable meaning.
' '\Vhen, however, this covenant is read with the
earlier admission in the lease that the premises
were 'in good condition' at the time of its execution, uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase
'in good tenantable repair' disappears and all the
language of the lease respecting the condition of the
premises as to repair may be given significance.
Thus read, the intention of the parties is adequately
manifested that the actual condition of the building
in respect to good tenantable repair existing when
the term began should be the condition as to good
tenantable repair in which the building was required
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
to be when delivered up to the p~aintiffs at the end
of the term, except as to the effect of reasonable
wearing and use.''
Applying this reasoning to the case at bar, here is
an agreement by the Lessees accepting the premises,
(including the roof) in the condition they were in on
February 19, 1945. Lessors' covenant is referable to
that condition, and they were obligated only to keep the
roof in such condition. Are they required to pay the cost
of destroying the roof and its supporting understruc-ture and constructing a new roof and understructure of
different materials~
LESSORS OBLIGATED TO MAKE ONLY ORDINARY REP AIR.S TO THE ROOF.
Except for Lessors' covenant in paragraph 8, they
would have no obligation whatever to make any repairs.
There is no implied covenant of the Lessor either
that the premises are fit for occupancy or that they are
safe for use. (32 Am. Ju,r. 516 and cases there cited.)
The authorities are to the effect that only by express
warranty can the Lessor be held responsible for the con~
dition of the premises, either at the date of the lease or
during the term. Otherwise he is not a guarantor of the
fitness of a building for the use- for which it is leased.
Robinson v. Wilson, (Wash.) 183 Pac. 331. In this. case,
the court quotes from Tiffany on ''Landlord and Tenant'' !P· 86: as follows :
''It is agreed by the authorities at the present
time that as a general rule there is no obligation on
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the part of the Lessor to see that the premises. are at
the time of the demise in a condition of fitness. for
use for the purposes for which the Lessee may propose to use them. A Lessee, like the purchaser of a
thing already in existence, is presumed to take only
after exan1ination. The maxim, caveat emptor, applies, and if he desires to protect himself in this regard, he must exact of the Lessor an express stipulation as to the condition of the premises. Accordingly a landlord is not bound, as a general rule, in
the absence of special stipulation, to make repairs
or improvements on the premises in order to render
them safe or fit them for the tenant's use.''
A covenant to repair or to keep in repair is referred
to in the cases as a ''general covenant'' and is construed
to obligate the Lessor to make only ordinary repairs as
distinguished from a larger or "special covenant'' to
make repairs that are wnusual or extraordinary. I-Ie·re
the Lessor makes only a general covenant; but the Lessee
makes the larger covenant.
By their "Bill of Particulars" appellants clearly
reveal what is tacitly admitted by Exhibit "D" attached
to their complaint that Lessees did not undertake to
repair the roof or to keep it in good condition (the obligation of the Lessors), but they removed the entire roof
and supporting structure constructed of wood, and substituted therefor one of steel beam construction. Unless
Lessors' obligation "to keep the roof in good condition
and repair" imposed a duty on them to build such a
new structure [roof] J Appellants have very clearly admitted that they have no cause of action. The question
of law is just that sirnple and there is. no necessity for the
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court to attempt to find a way through the jungle of immaterialities, inconsistencies and unwarranted assumptions contained in a!Ppellants' brief.
The courts have interpreted the "general covenant"
to be restricted as follows :
In May v. Gillis, (N.Y.) 62 N. E. 385, the court says:
''We think the words 'all inside and outside repairs' import merely a general covenant. Under
this clause the defendant was bound to make all
ordinary repairs, but was not called upon to make
those which were extraordinary.''
And in Freiot v. Jones, 204 N. Y. S. 446, the court
said:
"The obligation of a landlord to repair the
demised premises rests solely upon express contract. The covenant to repair will not be impJied
nor an e:x!press covenant be enlarged by construction. The only covenant to repair expressed in the
lease is 'also landlord to do outside repairs, tenant
to keep inside in repair.' This does not refer to
extraordinary repairs such as were necessary after
the fire. It is a general covenant to make ordinar¥
repairs only and under it the landlord was not obligated to restore the building after the fire.''
See also Houston v. Springer, 2 Raile (Pa. 1828) 97.
The covenant of the Lessors in the case at bar is one
to make necessary repairs to the roof then on the building as it had been accepted, not to reconstruct the roof.
In Lurcott v. Wakely, (1911) 1 K. B. 905, it is said:
''A roof falls out of re!pair; the neeessary work
is to replace decayed timbers by sound wood; to
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substitute sound tiles or slato8 for thos,e which are
cracked, broken or missing; to make good the flushings and the like. . . . I agree that if repair of
the whole subject matter has become impossible a
coyenant to repair does not carry an obligation to
renew or replace.''
See also l\ri~rou u. Gammon, (Ky.) 229' S. W. 75, heretofore cited.
In 140 TVest Thirty-Fourth Stt·eet Corp. v. Davis,
(1936) :285 N. Y. S. 957, it is held that a structural improvement, such as a new floor that a Building Department required to be laid, was held not within a Lessee's
covenant to make all repairs, inasmuch as only ordinary
repairs, and not the possibility that a structural rmprovement might be required, were contemplated.

" 'Repair' means to restore to a, sound or good
state after decay, injury, dil~pidation or partial destruction and is synonymous with 'mend' and 'renovate,' but generally does not mean to alter or
change condition or to replace with new or different material. Mozingo v. W ellsberg, 131 S. E. 717;
101 W.Va. 79."
•'As used in a lease in which the Lessee promises to keep the building in repair, the word '' repair' vvill be held to mean to mend, not to make a
new thing, but to refit, make good or restore an
existing thing, and when we speak of repairing a
thing the very ex;pression presupposes something in
existence to he repaired. Wattles v. South Omaha
Ice & Coal Co., 59 N. W. 785; citing numerous cases.''
See also Gulf City v. City of Galveston, 7 S. W. 520,
521, 59 Tex. 660; Fuche v. City of Cedar Rapids, 139 N.
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W. 803, 158 Iowa 392, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 590; Dougherty v. Taylor & Norton .Co., 63 S. E. 9'29, 930, 5 Ga. App.
773; Pl.aza Amusement Co. v. Rothenberg, (Miss.) 131
S. W. 351.
In Walker v. Cosgrove, (Ky. 1925) 273 S. W. 450,
tenant agreed to take good care· of said property, to
cause or permit no waste, to make all ordinary repairs.
The oourt said:
''If the property was in bad shape and the
drainage pipes were in a dila:pidated condition at the
time appellee Cosgrove leased the premises from
Perkins, we do not think he was obligated under his
contract to restore the waste pipe. It was not the .
duty of the tenant to add a drain pipe where none
had been before or make new one that was decayed
and useless at the time he went into possession, but
only to make ordinary repairs such as resulted from
and were made necessary by and from reasonable
use of the premises.''
The Lessors in this case were under no obligation to
take care of roof drainage, eyen ~' as alleged in the
complaint, appellants requested respondents to put the
roof in proper condition ''so as to J!rovide proper drain~
age", if it necessitated changing of the roof from its condition at the date of the lease·. The covenant ''to keep
the roof in good condition and repair" implies the ex~
istence of the roof as it had been accepted and the Lessor
became obligated only if such roof afterwards beeame out
of rH~pair. As before stated, the covenant cannot be exr
tended or enlarged.
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In D1cight v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., (Mass.) 128 Mass.
280, 282, the landlord contracted to ''repair and renew''
• ·H"Lso far as necessary the gutter of a )fill. I-Ield he was
obligated to n1ake such repairs and renewals as were
necessary in order that the existing gutter should do all
that it was capable of doing vYhen in good condition according to its orig1'nal const·nu1ction, and did not require
the Lessor to build a new gutter of a different construction, even though the original plan was defective.
In eomplaining of our interpretation of the lease,
counsel declare:

''The defendants filed lengthy briefs in which
they persistently and repeatedly inaccurately set
forth the Lessors' obligations with reference to the
roof. They cited numerous eases. involving only the
word 'repair' to the effect that keeping premis,es
in 'repair' meant only keeping the premises in the
state of repair they were in at the time they were entered upon by the Lessee. That, however, is not the
situation or the question present here. More than
repairs is involved. The complaint alleges that the
plaintiffs never ins!pected the roof, knew nothing
about the condition of it, had no concern with the
roof because of the defendants' assertions and representations that plaintiffs had no responsibility
for the roof and that they, defendants, would take
care of it. The lease does not limit defendants' duty
merely to keeping the roof in repair. They are also
required for the entire term to keep it in good con·
dition." (Br. 39').
Counsel realize that they are on narrow footing if
they must rely on the lease itself, so they assert· that it
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is alleged in the co-mplaint that ''plaintiffs never inspected the roof, knew nothing about the condition of it
. . . " and that defendants asserted and represented
that they "would take care of it." This same argument is
repeated -on page 55 of appellants' brief with the added
remark that in October, 1945 (eight months after the
lease was signed) "James L. White assured the pJaintiff, Hubert Wolfe, tha.t he had put the roof in good con-dition a.nd that it was in excellent shape." These state..
ments are substantially the same as the allegations of the
complaint (See App. Br. pp. 24-25) and constitute a
manifest effort to avoid the consequences of appellants'
written stipulation that they ''accept the premises in the
condition they are now in," that is, as. of February 19,
1945. There is no allegation that there was any fraud
when the agreement was signed or that the lease agreement was, for any consideration, modified by any oral
stipulations by the Lessors. The agreement measures the
obligations of the parties notwithstanding conversations
(if any there were) whether before or after the lease was
signed. This proposition is elementary.
In Van Leeuwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 530, it is
said:
''The appellant's contention is that the uncontradicted evidence being to the effect that the broker
Davis agreed to accept $300 as a full commission in
the event he succeeded in closing the deal, therefore
in any event the trial court should not have granted
judgment for more than $300. This contention cannot be sustained because whatever was said between
Davis and Huffaker concerning the amount of the
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commission, prior to and at the time of the signing
of the written listing contract, was merged in the
written contract. Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v.
Heath et al., 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342, 64 A. L. R. 368.
The writing defines the rights of the parties with
respect to the amount of commission which is to be
paid, and any evidence tending to vary or contra.dict the terms of the written instrument is incompetent, in the absence of fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation, none of which is claimed in this case,
and hence must be disregarded by the court.''
And in Hrillora.n Judge Trust Comparwy v. Heath, 70
Utah 124, 135, it is said:
''Nothing is better settled in the law, where there
is a contract in writing, than that all preliminary
negotiations are merged in the written contract.''
Likewise any statement of White after the lease was
signed that he had fixed the roof would be immaterial.
No liability could attach by reason of such a remark.
ACTS OF BUILDING INSPECTOR IMPOSED NO
OBLIGATION ON LESSORS
The Building Inspector might point out the things
he wanted changed (which he did not do) but he could
in no way change the contract between the parties as
to who would be obligated to pay for such changes.
Assunung then that the Lessors' only obligation was
to ''keep the roof in good condition and repair'' having
reference to the condition of the roof at the date of the
lease and to the Lessees' acceptance of the building in its
then condition, not to construct a new roof, where in the
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complaint is it alleged that the roof had become out of
repair after March 7, 1945 ~ We search the complaint in
vain for any such allegation. The lease required the
Lessee to make "permanent improvements . . . including the installation of a first class front . . . which
improvements shall cost not less, but may cost more than
$10,000," and it is. alleged that preliminary to making
said permanent improve·ments, the Lessees applied for a
permit and that the Building Inspector said (See letter
March 21, 1946·) :
"It has come to my attention that the rafters
which form the roof framing have been overstress•ed
and a.re sagging under the load they carry. Also
the girders between the columns at the rear are undersized and bowed." (Italics ours.) ( App. Br., p.
29.)
It is also alleged that he states:
''This condition must be remedied and therefore your application is being held in abeyance until
assurance is given that the roof condition will be
taken car1e of." (App. Br., p. 30.)
It is also alleged that after Hargreaves, the chief
Building Inspector, had made an inspection his criticism
was (letter of April 29, 1946; App. Br. pp. 30-31.) "that
the roof truss system fo·r the main forepart of the store"
and" the trusS<es were not adequate both as to design and
as to erection,'' but these criticisms which are· relied upon
by the plaintiffs do not constitute ground for complaint
against the Lessors. They relate to ''design and construction'' of the ''trusses'' and of the overstres•sing of
the "rafters which form the roof framing and to the
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'' ~tndersized'' girders which are ''bowed.'' It is nowhere
alleged that any of these conditions occurred after the
lease was made, and, of course, if they existed when the
lease was entered into they were conditions which the
Lessee expressly accepted. None of the so-called defects
complained of by the Building Inspector imposed any
duty on the Lessors when the Lessees accepted the building as it was, and when the Lessees expressly agreed that
all ''improvements, upkeep and repairs of every kind and
nature whatsoever, regardless of the extent thereof and
whether the same be ordinary or extr:aordinary amd regardless of how the same may be necessitated" (except
ordinary repairs to the roof) were to be made by the
Lessees. The improvements which were to cost $10,000.00 or more and which the Lessees were obligated to
make were undoubtedly structural improvements and so
regarded by the Lessees, for the lease itself provides
(Paragraph 3) :
''After said permanent improvements are made
it is agreed that further structwral c-hanges shall not
be made to said premises by the Lessees without
first obtaining the written consent of the Lessors.''
" 'Structural change' is such a ehange as to
affect a substantial and vital part of the premises
as would change its characteristic appearance, the
fundamental purpose o.f its erection or the uses contemplated or a change of such nature as would affect the very realty itself-extraordinary in scope
and effect or unusUJal in expenditure. Paye v. City
of Grosse Point, 271 N. W. 826, 279 Mich. 254."
See also Plaza A1nusement Co. v. Rothenberg,
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So in seeking the permit, the Lessees intended to
make pHrm:anent improvements which if they desired,
could include construction of a new roof of steel beam
construction but which had nothing at all to do with the
repair of the then Hxisting roof.
In Pratt v. Grafton Ele:atric Company, (Mass.) 65
N. E. 63, the lease provided that the LessHe should make
all necessary repairs, but the public authorities required
a repair to the gates of the mill pond, the subject mat~
ter of the lease. Held that it was not the Lessors' obligation to conform to the requirements of public authority.
In Knight v. Fo.s,ter, (N. C.) 79 S. E. 614, the. city
ordinance required that a gate on the leased premises
should he changed to swing inward instead of outward.
Held it was not a repair and the Lessor was. not obligated.
In Victor A. Harter Re.alty Company v. Lee, 132 N.
Y. 8. 447, it was held that the mere- fact that the order
of the Tenement House' Department was for such an alteration as would increase the value of the prope-rty
imposed no burden upon the landlord to make the alteration.

In Clark v. Yukon Inv. Co., (Wash.) 145 Pac. 624,

it is

he~ld:

"Laws of 1909, p. 43, regulating buildings used
for hotels, section 11 (Rem. & Bal. Code-, Sec. 6040)
of which imposes a penalty upon every owner,
manager, agent, or pers·on in charge of a hotel for
failure to comjply with the act, does not require the
owner of a building, le-ased for a long term to a
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tenant who is conducting a hotel on the premises,
under a lea.se which did not require the owner to
make repairs or equip the building for such purpose,
to pay for the installation of a fire eseape, as required by the city under the authority of that act;
the term ''owner of the hotel'' referring to the
ow-ner of the hotel business and not to the owner of
the building in which it was conducted.''
Counsel cite the case of Herald Square ReaUy Company v. Saks, (N. Y.) 109 N. E. 545, (Br. p. 48) to sup'"
port their contention that it was Lessors' obligation to
comply with requirements of public authorities. Assuming that any such requirements were legally made (which
we deny), said case is clearly inapplicable. There, pl'ans
for the building were submitted to the tenant and approved by him. These plans included a projection over
a portion of the sidewalk, of the show windows on the
ground floor. The plans were then submitted to the
munici)pal authorities and by them approved. The lease
was executed November 2, 1903, and it provided, among
other things that the Lessee should comply at its own expense with all requirements of public authorities. Eight
years later the municipality repealed all regulations
which permitted the Building Commissioner to allow
burilding encroachments on the sidewalk, and ordered all
such encroachments removed. The Lessor incurred the
ex;pense of the removal of the show-window obstruction
and sought to recover from the tenant under the covenant
of the Lessee hereinbefore mentioned. The court he,ld the
Lessee was not liable, using this languag~e :
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''This change in municipal policy bas
place since execution of the lease between
parties and the construction of the lease may
termined by extrinsic conditions that existed
time of its execution.

taken
these
be deat the

"It is not to he assumed therefore that the
comprehensive phrases of the lease of all of which
were quite germane and appropriate to existing
conditions, were intended to rupply to future events
not then in contemplation.
''The language of this lease, construed in the
light of contemporaneous regillations, UJsages and
customs, seems to require the conclusion that it was
not the purpose of the parties to subject the tenant
to an expense caused wholly by extraordinary and
unforeseen building alterations made necessary by
a subsequent and radical change in the policy of the
municipal government." (Italics ours.)
There is no similarity between the facts in that case
and those in the case at bar.
As we have shown, Lessors bad no obligation to heed
letters of the Building Inspector. Lessors' liability must
depend upon the lease itself, and the existence of a Building Code and the fact that an application was n1ade to
the Building Inspector can neither add to nor detract
from the Lessors' obligation under the lease. Therefore,
aU the allegations as to what the Building Oode requires
and as to what is contained in the letters of the Building
Inspector as to "design" or "erection" and as to what
Lessees claim they did to comply with his suggestions
or requirements are wholly irrelevant.
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But eyen if under some condi ti·ons Lessors might
haye been obligated to pay heed to the Building Inspector, the alleg-ations of the eomplaint show affirmatively
that no such obligation was imposed on the Lessors in
this case. Said Code (made a part of plaintiffs' complaint) among other things provides:
(a) No person shall repair any building without a
permit from the Building· Inspector upon apjpJication
therefor.
(b) The Building Inspector shall be furnished
with plans and specifications of the work to be done, except that in case of minor repairs the Inspector may
issue a permit without such plans and specifications.
(parenthetically may we remind the court that the
Building Inspector stated in his letter to Lessees of
:March :21, 1946, ''a plan showing your projposal will he
expected. '')
(c) The work must be done according to the Building Code (Building Code Section 201).
(d) The Building Inspector is authorized to enforce the Building Code.
(e) Whenever any building is used or occupied
contrary to the provisions of the Building Code, the
Building Inspector shall order such use or occw(pancy discontinued by notice served on any person using the same,
and the building shall be vacated withitn ten da;ys after
the service of such notice. Provided that in case of an
e1nergency:
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(f) Any building if found to be dangerous to person or property or wnsafe for the purposes for which it
is being used ma.y be condemned. The Building Insrr;).ector may order portions of the structure exposed for inspection and if the building is found to be unsafe, the
Building Inspector shall serve notice in writing on the
-owner, reputed owner or person in charge setting fo,rth
what must be done to make such building safe. The person receiving such notice must proceed within fortyeight hours thereafter to make the changes, repairs or
alterations set out in such notice.
(g) Service of notice in writing means "personal
service'' on the Lessor if within the city lirnits. (Section
301 Building Code.)
The allegations In plaintiffs' complaint show affirmatively that there was no compliance with the Building Code which could possibly impose any responsibility on Lessors:
(a) Because the notice alleged to have been given
Lessors was not personally served upon or even addressed to them.
(b) The notice alleged to have been given relates
to structural conditions and not to the roof.
(c) Said notice does not u set forth what must be
done" by way of repairs to the roof.
Therefore, taking all the allegations of the complaint, there is no basis for any liability on the Lessors,
even if the lease contemplated that Lessors should cmn·
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ply with the Building Code, (\Yhich we deny) for the
proper proceedings were not observed to impose such
or any responsibility.

LESSEES' SEEK: TO RECOVER FOR
STRUCTURAL IMPROVEMENTS
Counsel concede, and paragraph 3 of the lease pro~
\ides, that Lessees were obligated to make certain unspecified permanent improvements (including a first~
class front) to cost not less than $10,000.00 and that no
further ''structural improveme'ltts'' were to be made
without Lessors' consent. It was immaterial to Lessors
how much Lessees might determine to expend in excess
of the .$10,000.00 and, therefore, if they saw fit to substitute a new steel roof structure for the old one constructed of wood in making said ''permanent improvements,'' how can they expect to recover from Lessors
the cost of such roof structure~ They needed no other
consent or approval of the Lessors to build such new
roof structure than is contained in paragraph 3. But,
they argue, such "permanent improvements" did not
contemplate new roof construction for under the lease
the building was to have a safe roof structure and one
in good condition when Lessees went into possession, and
the building of a new roof was a structural improvement outside of and beyond the ''permanent improvements'' required of the lessee. As suggested above the
old roof structure had be-en accepted as of February
19th. Its structural condition then was, and must have
been, the same as found by the Building Inspector, for
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his criticism was as to ''the design and as to the erection'' of the trusses. V\7 e have also shown by the authorities that our obligation ''to keep the roof in good
condition and re,pair" did not obligate us to "put" or
"place" the roof in any other condition structually than
it was when the Lessees accepted it, or to make the
premises tenantable. It should be noted that differing
from the Lessors' restricted covenant to repair, the
Lessees' covenant is in the broadest language. Indeed
it is difficult to see how language could have been 1nore
effective to impose upon the Lessees the obligation to
do extraordinary alterations and repairs. It is evident
from a reading of the entire lease that the premises were
rented to Lessees ''as is'' at· a reduced rental, with the
clear understanding that they needed to be structually
remodeled to fit the needs of Lessees and this remodeling was to be at the expense of the Lessees. It would
he patently contrary to the intent of the parties, as
shown by the entire lease, to enlarge the Lessors' covenant beyond its legal meaning, which is that the Lessors
were to make only ordinary repairs to the roof, such as
is done by a roofer, as distinguished from a structural
steel worker. It is made plain by the bill of particulars
that the new steel roof structure enabled the Lessees
to create a store building with an eighty-foot span without a post in it. This might well be, a very advantageous thing to do for a Lessee with a ten-year lease with
an option of ten additional years, at a low rental. In
fact, paragraph 3 of the lease fixes the low rental of
$600.op per month "upon the express condition" that
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the expensive permanent improvements will be made;
and snid paragraph 3 further provides that ''Rental
shall be paid during the time said improvements are
being made," which further indicates that Lessees took
the building as it stood. Lessees should not be permitted to compel the Lessors to pay for such structural
alterations, when there was clearly no intention of the
parties, as shown by the lease, that the lessors were
supposed to bear any such expense.
To accept counsel's contention that the construe~
tion of the new steel roof structure was outside of the
"permanent improvements" Lessees were obligated to
make, puts the Lessees into an altogether untenable posi·
tion, for they concede that ''further structural improvements'' (other than the permanent improvements to
cost $10,000.00 or more) could not be n1ade without
Lessors' consent; that they did not have such consent,
yet they are seeking reimbursmnent for doing what confessedly they had no right to do. They do not allege
that the Building Inspector required them to remove
the wooden roof structure or to substitute one of steel,
or that he required any particular or specified work to
be done. It was the Lessees who decided what sort of
improvement, alteration or change of the roof structure
they would seek to hav,e the Lessors pay for, and they
proceeded to do this structural work, which they say
was in addition to the "permanent improvements,"
without getting Lessors' consent; and therefore, without any right to do it, and they now seek to have Lessors
pay for the new roof structure under Lessors' obliga-
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tion to" keep the old roof in good condition and repair."
This argument of Lessees defeats itself. They offer
anothe,r equally illogical reason why Lessors should
pay for the new steel roof structure. They cite authority
that if the Lessor fails to keep his covenant to repair,
Lessee may make such repairs and recover the cost from
the landlord or charge it against the rent, and yet they
admit that the wor!k the Le·ssees performed and for
which they are seeking to recover was not roof" repairs"
under any definition of that word, but was structural
improvement of the building, which they either have
agreed to make or had no legal right to make without
Lessors' consent, which consent they did not have, and
they admit that they continued to pay the rent.

THE CLAIMED BREACH OF COVENANT OF
QUIET ENJOYMENT
The lette:r:s of the Building Inspector do not, as appellants allege, refuse ''to allow the leased premises to
he occupied at all until the roof is made safe;'' (Br.,
p. 19) nor do they impose any obligation whatever on
the Lessors or the Lessees. The Building Inspector
went no further than to say that it was "mandatory
upon'' him
''to refus·e to allow continued occupancy of this
structure beyond the summ.er season for fear of
heavy snow loading, which might cause total beam
and truss failure and consequent collapse of the
ro,of structure,"
and this remark was not within his authority under the
Building Code. That Code (Section 301, which is made
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a part of the complaint, Br., p. ~0) provides that "in
the event of an emergency" when a building is "dangerous to person or property or ~~tnsafc for the purpose for
lrhich it is being used," it may be condemned, but before
condemnation, the Building Inspector shall serve notice
of "what is to be done" and that
''The person receiving such notice must commence within forty-eight ho~trs to make the changes,
repairs, or alterations set out in said notice and
shall proceed diligently with such work or demolish the building."
When there is no emergency and the building is being
used contrary to the Building Code, The Building Inspector may order his requirements complied with withitn ten days or that the building be vacated. The letter
of the Building Inspector attached to the complaint does
not come within any of said provisions of the Code,
and he could not refuse to permit the .building to be
occupied "beyond this summer season" (whatever these
words mean) because he had no such authority to make
such an order. He is required to conform to the Code
in making his directives and his letters show that he
did not do so. It is idle for counsel to argue that the
Building Inspector's mere statement as to what was
wrong with the building without setting forth "what
must be done" was sufficient to impose the obligation
on anyone to destroy the wooden structure and construct one of steel.
It is upon the provisions of the Building Code and
upon the letters of the Building Inspector that Lessees
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rely for their claim that Lessors breached their covenant to quiet enjoyment, that is to say, for Lessees
claim that they were excluded from the possession of
the premises for there is no other basis for their ''exclusion'' alleged in the complaint. "\Vho was in possession immediately after June 7, 1946~ Who was in
possession when Lessees applied for the permit and
when they tore off the old roof structure and constructed the steel roof structure~ By some kind of
left-handed logic, Lessees seem to claim that even during the time they were constructing the steel roof structure they were not in possession of the premises, even
though they confirmed their possession by the payment of rent, which they are now seeking to recover
back. So under the facts as appear from the complaint
itself, there was no exclusion from the premises, nor
any eviction. Plaintiffs rely upon Haywood v. Ogden
Motor Company, 71 Utah 417, to support their contention that Lessors breached their covenant of quiet enjoyin.ent, (Br., pp. 49-50) but in that case the Lessors
remained in actual possession of the premises making
certain repairs during part of the first month when
Lessees were entitled to possession and the court held
that in thus depriving Lessees of possession during such
period they committed a trespass, and that Lessees had
the right to counterclaim against an action for rent, for
the period possession was denied them. No claim of
trespass can be made against Lessors in this case, because Lessors were never in possession at any time subsequent to February 19, 1945, or even before ·while the
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Stewart Novelty Company's lease was in effect. Lessees
must, as a matter of law, base their claim of Lessors'
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment on eviction,
either actual or constructi .ue, for as stated by our court
in the Heywood case:
''It is also a general rule of law that a breach
of covenant for quiet enjoyment cannot occur without an eviction actual or constructive.''
Now, of course, Lessees cannot claim there was any
actual eviction and the authorities hold without dissent
that there can be no constructive eviction unless the
tenant abandons the premises and that such abandonment is necessary before the Lessee can defend against
a claim for the rental. 32 A'm. Jrur., pp. 231, 236, 391-2,
and cases cited. See also Stone v. Sullivan, (Mass.), 15
N. E. (2) 476; 116 A. L. R. 1223.
Our own court in Warm Spr·ings Co. v. Salt Lake
City, 50 Utah 58, 165 Pac. 788, recognizes this doctrine.
Lessees went into possession according to the lease
and they have been in possession ever since, and there
was, and could be, no breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, for the Building Inspector did not attempt
by anything set forth in his letters or otherwise to interfere with Lessees' possession on June 7, 1946, or at
any other time, nor did he order them to vacate, and
certainly no one else interfered with them. The contention of counsel with respect to this Inatter is wholly
without merit.
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LESSOR EXE11PT FROM LIABILITY
Even if by any possible construction of the allegations of the complaint, the covenant of the Lessors to
"keep the roof in good condition and repair" was
breached (and we say no such construction can be placed
upon them), nevertheless the Lessors are not liable.
Paragraph eleven of the lease provides:
''Lessors shall not be liable for any damage
occasioned by failure to keep said premises in repair and shall not be liable for any damage done,
caused or occasioned by or from plumbing, gas,
water, steam or other pipes, or the bursting, leaking or running of any washstand, tank, water closet
or waste pipe, in, upon or about said building or
premises, nor from any damage occasioned by water arising from acts or neglect of neighboring tenants."
This provision can only mean that the parties agreed
that the Lessors were absolved from liability for failure
to fulfill the only obligation imposed upon them, to-wit,
to "keep the roof in good condition and repair. " It
can not possibly relate to Lessees' failure to make repairs, because, without such provision, the Lessor could
not be liable for the Lessees' breach. The provision
must be given its plain and obvious meaning. It is tantamount to a covenant not to sue, and there is no legal
reason preventing the parties from entering into the
stipulation above quoted.
In Buchanan v. Tessler, (Ga.) 148 S. E. 614, the
lease provided :
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"The Lessee hereby releases Lessor from any
and all damag·e to both person and property and
will hold the Lessor harmless from all such damages
during the term of this lease. ' '
A subsequent paragraph provided:
"It is agreed the Lessor shall be called on to
mak,e no repairs of any nature whatsoever during
the term of this lease, except repairs to the roof."
It was held that Lessor was not liable for damages by
reason of the roof becoming out of repair.
In Gralnick v. illagid, (Mo.) 238 S. W. 132, the lease
provided:

''Lessor agrees to do repairing.''
It also contained the provision:

''Said Lessor shall not be liable to said Lessee
or agents, guests or employees for any damage
caused to his or their person or property by water,
rain, snow, ice, sleet, fire, storms and accidents, or
by breakage, stoppage or leakage of water, gas,
heating and sewer pipes upon, about or adjacent to
said premises.''
The court uses this language :
''While it is true in paragraph three, 'the Lessor
agrees to do repairing' that paragraph nowhere
states what kind of repairing she is to do, but most
certainly that paragraph does not mean that the
Lessor was to make such repairs as would protect
the Lessee and his property from damages on account of rain and water, ice, etc. for the obvious
reason that both parties had agreed in paragraph
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damages done to the property of the Lessee on account of water, rain, ice, etc. . . .
''But be that as it nmy, and concede for the
sake of argument without deciding it, that the
words 'the Lessor agrees to do repairing' as found
in paragraph three, meant that she was to replace
the roof or other parts of the building when destroyed by fire, yet we are unable to see in what
possible manner that would benefit the Lessee in this
case or render the Lessor liable when both parties
clearly agree by the language found in paragraph
one that the Lessor should not be liable to the Lessee
because of any damages done to him or his property on account of rain, water, etc.''
In Inglis v. Garland, (Cal.) 64 Pac. (2d) 501, the
lease provided:
"Tenant agrees that tenant will not, and that
agents, servants and others claiming the right under tenants to be in the premises or in said building
. . . shall not make any claim against landlord for
any injury, loss or damage to person or property
occurring therein from any cause.''
The tenant claimed damage as a result of a defective
roof drain-pipe. The landlord had undertaken to repair the roof, but in such repairs the defective drain pipe
had been overlooked. Held that the landlord was not
liable in view of the above quoted provision.
In Higgins v. Menckton, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 20,
1938), 83 Pac. (2d) 516 at 521, several leases were involv,ed, all having clauses to about the same effect, that
''the Lessee shall not claim or have any dmnages, or right
to claim damages by reason of any reclan1ation work or
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leYee work which may in any way affect the demised
premises or by reason of the failure to perfm·m any of
said work.'' The court said:
. '• These clauses quoted from the 3 leases have a
double application and significance. They are in
plain and unequivocal language complete releases
of all claims for damages against the lessor arising
out of poor construction or poor maintenance of the
levees, and they are at the same time full waivers of
any claim or right of action based upon the covenants of the contracts of 1902 and 1905. ''
The court sustained a general demurrer in a suit
brought for both breach of contract and in tort arising
from the fact that the levees broke and inundated the
lands of the Lessees.

In Franklin Fire lfYls. Co. v. Moll, (Ind.) 58 N. E.
(2d) 947, the plaintiff sought damages suffered by. its
assured due to leaks in the plumbing. The lease provided:
''Lessor not liable for any damage or InJury
sustained by Lessee due to building becoming out of
repair or from water or steam or from plumbing or
pipes or from any tank, wash stand or water closet
or from water or ice from the roof.''
The contention was made that this provision did not
exempt the Lessor from liability for his negligenoe in
maintaining the plumbing in good condition which he
was obligated to do. The court sustained a general demurrer to the complaint on the ground that ev·en if the
landlord was negligent, the foregoing provision absolved
him byfrom
liability.
See for
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In Peca.rre v. Grover, 5 La. Ct. of App. 676, the statute made Lessor responsible for vices or defects in
leased premises. The lease provided:
''No repairs shall he done by Lessor except such
as may he needed to the roof.
''The Lessor will not he responsible for damages caused by leaks in the roof or by any vice or
defect on the leased premises except in the case of
positive neglect on his part to have the repairs made
after notice.''
The syllabus reads.:
"It is lawful to stipulate in a lease that the
Lessor shall not be responsible for damages caused
by any vice or defect on the leased premises. With
such a stipulation in a leas.e the Lessee cannot re-·
cover damages against the Lessor for injury re~
ceived from falling plaster. Such a stipulation is
not against public policy.''
In the body of the opinion, the court says :
''Very often parties insert in the lease clauses
having for their object to restrict the obligation of
warranty of the Lessor; these claims be it understood should receive their execution and the Lessor
shall not be held for any warranty for the vice or
the vices of which he is formally exonerated.''
In another part of the opinion the court said:
"But the Lessor may by a clause of the· lease
put aside or restrict his warranty just as the Lessee
may expressly or impliedly renounce the warranty.
Public order is not interested in the question.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43
See also BuUock v. Colema.n, (Ala.) 33 So. 884.
The only case on the question of exemption of the
landlord from liability which counsel cite is Columbia
Labora.tories r. Califor·uia Beauty Supply Co., 148 Pac.
(2d) 15, which is not in point at all. In that case, the
court simply held that if property not covered by the
lease became out of repair so that the tenant (of other
premises) suffered injury, the landlord would he liable.
Why the case is cited, counsel alone can give a reason.
COM~1E~TS

ON

IM~IATERIAL

ALLEGATIONS

The complaint contains allegations which are, in substance, repeated in appellants' brief and which can have
no possible bearing on the legal obligations of the parties. We shall refer to only a few of them. References
are to the pages of Appellants' Brief.
Page 45:
''We accepted the premises in the condition they
were in only upon defendants' express agreement
that the roof would be made and kept safe for the
entire term of the lease, and particularly at the time
we were to have the right of occupancy."

Any such ''express agreernent'' was clearly superseded by the written agreement Fhereby Lessees accepted the building as it was. Halloran-Judge Tr. Co. v.
Heath, 70 Utah 124.
Page 46:
"Thus on June 7, 1946, when defendants had
agreed we might enter into possession of the prop-
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erty, we were r~efused a building permit and thus
prevented from making the permanent improvements which we had agreed to make because of
plaintiffs' dereliction, and we were also advised definitely that continued occupancy of the structure
would not be allowed. We could not get a building
permit and we could not occupy the premises because the roof was unsafe." (Italics ours.)
Respondents did not agree to obtain for appellants,
or guarantee that appellants could obtain, a building
permit to make the permanent improvements. According to their complaint, they actually made permanent
improvements, so they were not ''prevented from making" them. Did they make them without a permit~ If
they ''could not occupy the premises because the roof
was unsafe,'' who was occupying the premises when
the permanent improvements were being made~ Appellants' conduct disputes their own statem.ents.
Furthermore, as the foregoing staten1ent and the
argument at page 50 of the brief have no relation to
any other claim of appellants except that there was a
breach by respondents of the covenant of quiet ~enjoy
ment, please bear in mind that such covenant is not
breached except there be an eviction (Haywood v. Ogden
Motor Co., 71 Utah 417) and even to rely on constructive eviction, the tenant must abandon the premises.
(Stone v. Sullivan, (Mass.) 15 N. E. (2d) 476.)
Page 47:
''The defendants never at any time attempted
by any proper proceedings to remove the objections
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of the Building Inspector or to comply with his
requirements.''
The Building Inspector never at any time made any
requirements. At no time did he ''set forth what must
be done" as required by the Building Code, and if he had,
in view of the specific covenant of the Lessees to make
all improvements and repairs (except ordinary repairs
to the roof) ''regardless of how the same may be necessitated," it would have been Lessees' duty to follow the
directiYe of the Building Inspector. The Building Inspector's criticism related wholly to structural defects,
and Lessees cannot hold Lessors for the cost of permanent improvements of upwards of $10,000.00 they were
obligated to make, and did make, whether with a permit
or without, by asserting that Lessors failed to make it
possible for them to secure such permit.
Page 48:
"Unless the lease itself requires the tenant to do
so, the tenant is under no duty to make changes,
structural or otherwise, or alterations or improvements ordered by the public authorities.''
If the letters of the Building Inspector can be con,...
strued as an order to do anything, then what he required
to be done was something "necessitated" within the specific obligation of appellants under the lease.
Page 53:
'' BH·ause the city authorities said the roof was
unsafe, that fact alone required son1eone to make
the roof safe. At the time the building inspector
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declared the roof to be unsafe, we had neither the
actual possession, nor the right to possession of the
premises. We couldn't have gone in and fixed the
roof had we desired. It was still in this condition
when our right to possession under the lease accrued." (Italics ours.)
This statement is more of counsel's mental gymnastics. Is it true that merely because the Building Inspector declared the roof to be unsafe, someone (irrespective of the provisions of the lease) bad to make it
safe~
That declaration taken alone impos·ed no duty
on anyone. The building might have been left just as it
was even if appellants could not have used it. Resort
must be had to the leas·e to ascertain who ''had to make
it safe.'' Certainly Lessors did not covenant to do so .
. A.ppellants say "they couldn't have gone in and fixed it."
Well, as soon as their "right of possession accrued,"
they did actually ''go in'' while the roof ''was still in
this condition" and construct a ne.w roof of steel beam
construction and a new understructure. If they did not
possess the right to do this work under the lease, from
what source did they derive their authority~
Page 55:
"We also alleged that the roof was unsafe and
not in good condition and repair in January and
became progressively worse, and that at the time
we were to take possession in June, it bad become
so unsafe a.s to be dangerous; that we do not know
when the roof first became dangerous but that it
did become dangerous and became progressively
worse from the date of the lease until J nne 7, 1946. ''
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Yet at pag-e 53, counsel deelnrcs: ''At the tim.e the
building inspector declared the roof to be unsafe," appellants had no ''right to possession of the premises,''
(that was in ~Iarrh, 1946) and adds: "It ·w·as still in this
condition" (that is, the same condition) "when our right
to possession under the lease accrued.''
Furthermore, the allegation that after the lease was
entered into the roof conunenced to sag, which sagging
gradttw;lly becmne zrorse, adds nothing to impose liability
on Lessors. If Lessors were liable at all to construct a
new roof, it is immaterial when the roof began to sag.
It is apparent from the complaint that if such sagging
occurred it was due to original faulty construction. If
the sagging required extraordinary repairs such as the
construction of an entirely new roof (a steel roof) the
lease imposed the duty upon the Lessees, not the Lessors.
By way of conclusion, let us very briefly summarize.
There is no implied covenant on the part of a
Lessor that leased premises are fit for occupancy or
tenantable or inhabitable or safe for use. If the Lessee
would have any such guarantee., he must have it expressly set forth in the lease.
1.

32 Am. Jur. 526;

Robinson v. Wilson, (Wash.) 183 Pac. 331;
Tiffany on Landlord•and Tenant, p. 86.
2. The lease in the case at bar contains no such
covenant or guarantee, the Lessors being bound by the
one covenant only, to ''keep the roof in good condition
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3. The covenant of the Lessors to ''keep the roof
in good condition and re,pair" cannot be enlarged by
construction and means the same as the covenant to
keep the roof in as good condition as when the lease
was made, that is, in its condition on February 19, 1945,
and said covenant is not a covenant that the building was
safe or fit for occ1.1tpancy or tenantable. Farr v. Wasatch
Chemical Company, (Utah) 143 Pac. (2d) 281, clearly
holds that a covenant ''to keep the floor and roof in
good order and repair so as to keep said premises ten~
an table'' did not obligate the Lessor to place the building in a tenantable condition.
4. Lessors' covenant was to keep the old roof in
the condition in which it had been accepted, not to construct a roof structure of steel. Lessor's only obligation was to make ''ordinary repairs'' to the existing roof.
5. There was no order of public authorities for the
construction of a steel roof structure or any order to do
any specific work. Nothing was done by the Building
Inspector which obligated either the Lessors or the
Lessees to do anything. The provisions of the Ordinance
were not followed so as to impose any obligation on
anyone. If any valid order had been made, it would
have been the Le,ss·ees' obligation to comply if they desired to continue to occupy the building as their covenant to make ''permanent improvements'' to cost $10,000.00 or more and to make ''all improvements, upkeep
and repa.irs of every kind a1nd natu1"e and whether the
same be ordinary or extraordinary and regardless of how
the same may be necessitated" is so all-inclusive that no
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other construction can fairly be gi \'en to the language
other than that Lessees were bound to do whatever under
existing ordinances the public authorities might require.

6. If the construction of the new steel roof structure is to be regarded as not included within the "permanent impro1·ements," then Less,ees had no right to
construct it without Lessors' consent, and such consent
not ha,ing been obtained, Lessees cannot recover from
Lessors the cost ther,eof.
7. There was no breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment because there was no eviction, actual or constructive, and no abandonment of the premises by the
Lessees, and they ar~e therefore, not entitled to recover
rent paid to Lessors or to recover rental paid on the
premises they continu~to occupy during the time they
were making the ''permanent improvements'' on the
leased premises or wrongfully making ''further structural changes" without the Lessors' consent.
8. The Lessors being absolved from liability under
paragraph 11 of the lease, no action can be maintained
against the,m even if they violated the covenant contained in the lease (which we deny).

The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

JESSE R. S. BUDGE,
H. L. MULLINER,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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